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The Discursive Legitimation of Political Regimes:  
A Network Perspective 
ABSTRACT 
In this working paper, we treat legitimacy and legitimation as interactive, discursive and 
relational concepts: Legitimacy is socially constructed in the public spheres of (demo-
cratic) political regimes, that is, in discursive exchanges of political elites and citizens 
about the acceptability of these regimes. Legitimacy claims and assessments establish a 
link between regimes and their institutions on the one hand, and normative benchmarks 
on the other. Hence they may be examined with the help of discourse network analysis 
– a novel application of network analysis whose rationale and potential are illustrated on 
the basis of a corpus of legitimation statements gleaned from German and US quality 
newspapers. Our method enables us to discover and visualize the structures of legitima-
tion discourses – prominent speaker types, privileged legitimation criteria and discourse 
coalitions – and to offer some conjectures on the link between discourses and the insti-
tutional arrangements of the German and US polities. 
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The Discursive Legitimation of Political Regimes:  
A Network Perspective 
INTRODUCTION 
Legitimacy is a core issue of political science (Beetham 1991: 7), yet the study of le-
gitimation processes and practices remains widely neglected. As a consequence, the 
social construction of legitimacy is still not well understood. Legitimacy as an empirical 
phenomenon is (re-)produced, contested, and transformed in social interactions of po-
litical elites and citizens. These interactions are mostly in the form of public communi-
cation (Luckmann 1987: 11; Barker 2001; Raufer 2005). Legitimacy-related public 
communication is, in turn, embedded in varying political cultures and institutional set-
tings that create opportunities and constraints for speakers and their propositions 
(Schmidt 2008). A focus on the structures and dynamics of legitimation discourses is 
therefore required to tap into legitimation processes (Schmidtke and Schneider 2012). 
Legitimacy is a relational concept. It is not an attribute of a political system and its 
institutions, but rather a relationship between this system and citizens who consider it 
legitimate or not. Our paper therefore employs a genuinely relational methodology to 
study legitimation. We focus on the structures of legitimation discourses related to na-
tional political regimes and introduce a method – discourse network analysis – that ena-
bles us to shed light on the actor constellations and repertoires of justifications encoun-
tered in this type of public communication. Who participates in it? Which claims and 
assessments are put forward – and which justifications for them are given – by different 
speakers? Which discourse coalitions exist? The empirical analysis relies on a text cor-
pus reflecting legitimation discourses in the quality press of Germany and the United 
States.1 In the following section, we outline our rationale for a discourse perspective on 
legitimation and then present the method of discourse network analysis. In the main 
section, we examine the structures and actor constellations of German and American 
legitimation discourses over a ten-year period (1998-2007). The analysis reveals char-
acteristic discourse coalitions and framings of the legitimacy issue in both national in-
stitutional settings. As the incumbents of political authority roles are prominent voices 
in both cases, our findings also enable us to offer some tentative conjectures about the 
                                                 
1 The text corpus and data set used here were created jointly with the collaborators of a research project carried out 
at the Transformations of the State Research Center, University of Bremen (Dominika Biegoń, Jennifer Gronau, 
Martin Nonhoff, and Henning Schmidtke), and directed by Frank Nullmeier. The financial support of the German 
Research Foundation (DFG) for this project is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank our two anonymous re-
viewers for their helpful comments. 
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relationship between legitimation discourses and nationally specific institutional ar-
rangements. 
LEGITIMATION DISCOURSES AND NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Legitimacy is used as an empirical concept here. A political regime is legitimate if it 
enjoys a modicum of diffuse support (Easton 1965, 1975), thus relying on voluntary, 
explicit and normatively grounded consent in addition to mere acquiescence, the fear of 
sanctions, or self-interest (Weber 1968: para. 5; Hurd 1999: 383–9). Legitimacy in this 
empirical sense may not be viewed as a quasi-objective attribute of a regime and its in-
stitutions. Rather, social and discursive interactions of political elites and citizens un-
derpin legitimation processes. As Weber and Luckmann (1987: 111) remind us, political 
elites have a vested interest in the mobilization of support and the (re-)production of 
legitimacy beliefs, and hence may be expected to put forward (self-)legitimating claims 
– justifications of their political authority – on an ongoing basis. The kind of normative-
ly grounded regime support that we call legitimacy obtains – and its foundations are 
successfully reproduced – where such claims are submitted to the court of public opin-
ion, evaluated and widely accepted by citizens. 
In short, while the nature of legitimation processes is essentially discursive, we 
should expect them to unfold in the public spheres of (democratic) political systems 
(Peters 2007). These legitimation discourses may occur in different arenas, in the pri-
vate conversations of laypersons as well as in parliamentary or scholarly debates. In our 
own empirical work, we concentrate on the media and, more specifically, the quality 
press. The media play a key role in the constitution of public spheres. As for opinion-
leading newspapers, they arguably continue to play an important role in the documenta-
tion and framing of public debates in modern societies. The media at large and newspa-
pers, then, have a watchdog function and serve as gatekeepers between the political sys-
tem and citizens at large (Habermas 1974; Wessler et al. 2008; Gerhards and Schäfer 
2010). In the legitimation context, they play a double role – on the one hand, as a cru-
cial platform for the legitimacy claims and assessments of political elites and civil so-
ciety, and on the other, as key participants in legitimacy-related discourses. It goes 
without saying that the analysis of legitimation debates reflected in, or highlighted by, 
the quality press will reveal characteristic biases of that discursive arena. Journalists 
contribute legitimacy evaluations or select and cite other people’s assessments accord-
ing to their own criteria of appropriateness and relevance. While discourses in the quali-
ty press are therefore unlikely to be “representative” of public communication at large, 
their biases matter precisely because of the key role of the media in the (re-)production 
of legitimacy and because some types of speakers or assessments are likely to be given 
more voice or “traction” than others. 
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But how may legitimation discourses be identified and examined? We argue that a 
proposition in which some kind of actor (speaker) evaluates a political system as a 
whole, its elites, or some of its institutions as legitimate or illegitimate, giving reasons 
(justifications) for her assessment, may be viewed as the core practice of legitimation. 
Such legitimation statements may be (self-)legitimating claims put forward by political 
elites or assessments formulated by journalists, “simple” citizens, interest-group repre-
sentatives, and other members of a political community. They may be described with 
the help of a stylized legitimation grammar that takes its inspiration from the S(ubject)-
A(ction)-O(bject) scheme and its extensions used in claims analysis (Koopmans and 
Statham 1999; Franzosi 2004; Adam 2008). Four key variables define these statements 
– the precise object that is assessed, the legitimating (positive) or delegitimating (nega-
tive) thrust of the evaluation, the normative criterion on which it is based, and the 
speaker (Table 1).2 
Table 1: Legitimation grammar and examples 
Example 1: Tim B. Müller 
(journalist) says: “Deutsch-
land schläft. Seine Politiker 
erstarren in zynischer Ein-
fallslosigkeit” (SZ, 4 De-
cember 2002). 
The German 
political system 
and its elites 
are… 
illegitimate… because… they lack innovative capacity. 
Example 2: Massachusetts 
House Speaker Thomas M. 
Finneran says: “The people 
and their representatives 
have been sent to the side-
lines by the courts, and 
that’s not right” (Washing-
ton Post, 6 February 2004). 
The US  
judiciary is… illegitimate… because… 
it undermines popular 
sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
2 Statements that evaluate the specific incumbents of political authority roles (Easton’s authorities) were excluded 
from the data set; all propositions thus assess the German or American political system or community as a whole, 
regime principles (e.g., democracy or the rule of law), specific core institutions (e.g., the Bundestag or the Presi-
dency), or key actor groups (such as the political class or the party system). While this distinction turns out to be 
highly relevant (for instance, general assessments of the political system are more likely to be affirmative than 
evaluations of actor groups; see Table 3 in the appendix), it will be ignored here in order to highlight the link be-
tween speaker types participating in legitimation discourses and reasons given for their assessments. Hence we do 
not necessarily claim that statements evaluating these different various reference objects have the same weight. 
Yet they all represent evaluations of regime elements and should therefore also be taken seriously as elements of 
legitimation discourses. 
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These statements may of course be examined with the help of traditional content-
analytical and statistical procedures (as in our own previous work, see, for instance, 
Hurrelmann et al. 2009). Such an approach, however, risks to obfuscate the relational 
nature of the data gleaned from legitimacy-related propositions with the help of our 
grammar. Each statement connects speakers with legitimation criteria and objects to 
evaluate the latter positively or negatively. The participants of legitimation discourses 
and the reasons offered by them for their (de-)legitimating evaluations of political sys-
tems and institutions may therefore be conceptualized as networks, and our data may be 
visualized and interpreted with the help of the novel method of discourse network anal-
ysis (Leifeld 2009; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). In contrast with standard applications of 
network analysis in the social sciences (McClurg and Young 2011), the method is used 
here to represent discursive rather than social relationships. These discourse networks 
link speakers with legitimation criteria. On the basis of a coded set of legitimation 
statements, an affiliation network Gaff connecting actors a1, a2, … am (in our case, speak-
ers) with concepts c1, c2, … cn (in our case, legitimation criteria) may be created, as in-
dicated by the solid lines in Figure 1. These lines are directed (arcs) because actors se-
lect concepts, not the other way around. 
Figure 1: Basic discourse network model 
 
Source: Janning et al. 2009: 71 
Moreover, since an actor uses a concept at a specific time t, for each point in time an 
affiliation network Gtaff exists. Finally, actors may draw on any legitimation criterion to 
either legitimate or delegitimate a regime or one of its elements. Actor a1 could, for in-
stance, argue that her government is illegitimate because it disrespects popular sover-
eignty while actor a2 claims precisely the opposite, thus affirming that the government 
respects popular sovereignty and therefore has to be viewed as legitimate. A negative or 
positive sign attached to the value of the arc connecting actor and concept indicates this 
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piece of information in the network model. Such a discourse network is a directed tem-
poral signed 2-mode network. Two derivative 1-mode networks linked to this original 
network may be generated by connecting actors that share a concept or concepts used by 
the same actors. These co-occurrence networks are undirected; they are visualized by 
the dotted lines in Figure 1.3 
LEGITIMATION DISCOURSE NETWORKS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
Articles from two quality newspapers per country (Germany: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
and Süddeutsche Zeitung; United States: Washington Post and New York Times), pub-
lished between 1998 and 2007 in twelve-day time windows around the Chancellor’s 
annual Government Declaration on the budget and the President’s State of the Union 
Address, and containing one or more legitimation statements were included in our text 
corpus; the individual propositions were coded using our legitimation grammar. This 
procedure yielded a text corpus of 798 newspaper articles (DE: 308, US: 490)  and a 
data set of 1,985 legitimation statements (DE: 752; US: 1,233). The propositions in the 
data set may be assessments made by journalists themselves, (direct) citations, or legit-
imation statements attributed to various other speaker types, notably including the rep-
resentatives of political institutions and members of civil society (see also Table 2 in the 
appendix). 
We begin our analysis with a quick glance at the full discourse networks for Germa-
ny and the United States, including all speaker types and legitimation criteria that oc-
curred in the two public spheres (Figure 2). These otherwise rather unwieldy diagrams 
will also be used to provide some additional information on the technicalities of net-
work graphs and our coding scheme. Speakers are represented by white circles and le-
gitimation criteria by blue squares in each of these graphs. The color of the arcs indi-
cates whether an actor uses the connected concept to legitimate (green) or to delegiti-
mate (orange) an element of her political order. The size of the nodes represents the 
relative number of statements made by an actor and the width of the arcs indicates how 
often the respective actor has used the connected legitimation criterion. The relative 
                                                 
3 By accounting for negative or positive arc values, six more specific actor and concept networks may be gener-
ated: a positive and a negative congruence network connecting actors that use the same concepts in the same way 
and a conflict network in which edges are formed if two actors disagree on a concept; and conversely, two con-
gruence networks of concepts connected through like-minded actors and a conflict network of concepts connected 
through disagreeing actors. Again, these derivative networks may be generated for each point in time t, enabling 
an analysis of network evolution. For this article, however, we only use the original 2-mode network and the de-
rived congruence networks. 
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centrality of an actor or a concept (that is, the frequency of their appearance or use in 
our material) determines the position in the graph, with the most central actors and con-
cepts in the center and the less central ones in the periphery. 
The complex networks depicted in Figure 2 illustrate a number of points: First, a 
broad range of individual and collective actors participate in mediated public debates on 
the legitimacy of the German and US political systems with their regime principles, 
core institutions, and major actor groups. There is, in other words, genuine discursive 
interaction that notably includes different voices from civil society and political elites. 
As expected, in both countries, the journalists of opinion-leading papers themselves are 
key participants in these discourses; in Germany, they play an even more prominent role 
than in the US, contributing almost 40 per cent as opposed to 21 per cent of all legitima-
tion statements. While speakers associated with civil society contributed roughly a quar-
ter of all statements in both cases, the role of political actors as contributors to legitima-
tion discourses is more prominent in the United States than in Germany (52 v. 37 per 
cent; Table 3 in the appendix). Turning to the finer-grained typology of speakers used in 
the graphs, it is readily apparent that a small number of core actors besides journalists 
dominate the legitimation discourses in each of the two cases.4 Interestingly, this distri-
bution of speaker types is not what one might have expected in light of hypotheses 
gleaned from the literature on varying media cultures. According to Hallin and Mancini 
(2004), corporatist media systems are characterized by a relatively strong partisan orien-
tation and rather close links between journalists and political elites while the media are 
more independent in liberal systems. Thus speakers associated with the regime and their 
legitimacy claims should have been more prominent in the corporatist media system of 
Germany than in the liberal system of the United States. 
A small number of criteria are privileged. Interestingly, “unspecific” legitimacy as-
sessments (that is, evaluations made without reference to an explicit normative bench-
mark) are quite frequent, with shares of roughly 20 per cent in both cases. These state-
ments, which are no fully formed propositions in light of our legitimation grammar and 
may be viewed as less discursively rational because they offer no explicit justification 
(Gerhards 1997), are more often used in a positive fashion than critically (57 per cent of 
these statements are legitimating in Germany and 68 per cent in the United States). In 
other words, they represent a legitimation resource, a discursive practice typically used 
                                                 
4 Each of the three broad categories of speakers (journalists, political actors, civil society) was further subdivided. 
Thus journalists are distinguished by newspaper, political actors by the institution or branch of government they 
represent (and by government or opposition party affiliation), and civil society by actor groups (e.g., business, 
NGOs, academia, etc.). In addition, we distinguish between domestic and foreign speakers (marked “_others” in 
the graphs). 
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Figure 2: German and US discourse networks, 1998–2007, all speaker types and le-
gitimation criteria (N = 752 (DE); 1,233 (US)) 
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for the affirmation of national political orders and their elements. Conversely, delegiti-
mating propositions are visibly more in need of argumentative backing or reason-
giving. 
Once again, it seems useful to aggregate our finer-grained categories. We therefore 
distinguish four groups of legitimation criteria; a twofold distinction between demo-
cratic and non-democratic as well as input and output criteria enables us to assess our 
data in light of prominent normative debates in the literature (Scharpf 1999: 17–28). As 
Table 3 (in the appendix) indicates, the distribution of these four groups of criteria in 
the German and American discourses is remarkably similar and the ranking – non-
democratic output with 27 and 24 per cent, respectively, followed by democratic input, 
non-democratic input, and democratic output – is the same; only the category of demo-
cratic output (which notably includes evaluations in light of human and civil rights pro-
tection) is considerably more prominent in the United States (where this type of evalua-
tions typically refers to “freedom” or “liberty”) than in Germany. 
Yet beyond such frequency distributions of individual variables, the graphs also vis-
ualize relationships between speaker types and legitimation criteria that are employed 
affirmatively or critically: While few speaker types contribute only positive or negative 
statements to the German or American discourse, and most draw on a remarkable varie-
ty of normative benchmarks to evaluate their political system and to justify their as-
sessments, affinities between speaker types, the overall thrust of their evaluations, and 
privileged legitimation criteria emerge. 
Such patterns – which will be examined in greater detail below – help us put the 
overall legitimacy levels of the German and American discourses (the percentage shares 
of legitimating as opposed to critical statements) into perspective. While the figures 
reveal a fair amount of contestation in both cases, legitimating statements (54 per cent) 
prevail in the United States; hardly more than a third of all statements (36 per cent) are 
positive in Germany. At first glance, the presence of many critical evaluations in the 
public spheres of the two countries may be interpreted as a sign of low regime support, 
but also as evidence for vivid, “healthy” political debates among “critical citizens” 
(Norris 1999). The ultimate meaning of these legitimacy levels very much hinges on the 
kinds of speakers that contribute positive or negative assessments, and on the criteria 
used by each of the speaker types to justify these evaluations. 
CORE DISCOURSE NETWORKS 
While the information density of the complete network graphs is remarkable (they con-
tain information on all speaker types and their legitimacy assessments), there is clearly 
too much “noise” here for a more in-depth analysis. For instance, 25 of the speaker 
types distinguished by our coding scheme contributed less than five legitimation state-
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ments to the German discourse over the examined ten-year period; it is reasonable to 
assume that they had a negligible influence. Likewise, in the complete US network, 256 
edges have a line value of one, indicating that a legitimation criterion was used only 
once by a specific actor category between 1998 and 2007. For instance, the legitimation 
criterion “reversibility” was used once by the representative of an NGO and once by a 
member of the non-presidential party in Congress. The criterion therefore had little rel-
evance for these speaker types and ultimately for the US legitimation discourse as a 
whole. 
In order to eliminate some of this random noise and to highlight the more permanent 
structural features of the two discourse networks, we base our analysis in this section on 
network cores; more precisely, for the analysis of the affiliation networks we use the 
(5,2)-cores of the German and US affiliation networks. In general, a (k,m)-core of a 
network consists of the maximal sub-network in which each vertex has at least degree k 
and which contains the lines with a value of m and higher (de Nooy, Mrvar, and 
Batagelj 2005: 109). Subsequently, we consider networks consisting of all actor catego-
ries to which at least five evaluative statements were attributed in the press and all le-
gitimation criteria that were mentioned at least five times; moreover, network relations 
are only considered if actors from the same category used the same argument at least 
twice in the ten-year period.5 These low cut-off values were chosen to retain a maxi-
mum of complexity. Finally, unspecific evaluations were ignored, since they would 
have established connections between actors reflecting no more than their mutual lack 
of a genuine argument, and hence would have been of little substantive interest in an 
analysis of the normative orientations and foundations of different speaker types and 
their propositions. 
Who exactly contributes to mediated legitimation discourses – or more precisely, 
whose voice is considered important by journalists? Which legitimation criteria do these 
speakers privilege, and do they tend to use them in an affirmative or a critical fashion? 
While we do not intend to formally test specific hypotheses on the link between dis-
courses and institutional settings here, it appears plausible enough to probe such a link. 
For variation in institutional settings may create more or less favorable discursive op-
portunity structures for different types of speakers and legitimation statements. A prom-
inent role in the constitutional or social order (e.g., governments, powerful organized 
interests) should translate into higher visibility, more press coverage and voice, and also 
a greater chance to feed one’s own legitimacy assessments into public debates. While 
                                                 
5 Note that this procedure yields different networks depending on the reduction sequence. To retain the maximal 
number of nodes, we first removed all vertices with a degree < 5, then all lines with a value < 2, and finally re-
moved isolates produced in the second step. 
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both Germany and the United States are established democracies and federal regimes, 
however, the former is a corporatist parliamentary system and the latter a presidential 
system with a more pluralist tradition of interest representation (Lijphart 1999). In line 
with such differences, governments and representatives of privileged corporative actors 
(business associations, trade unions) may be expected to be particularly dominant 
speaker types in the German parliamentary and corporatist system. By contrast, there 
might be more of a balance between the executive and the legislature as well as a broad-
er range of speaker types associated with civil society in the legitimation discourses of 
the American presidential and pluralist system. Moreover, regimes and their core execu-
tive, legislative and judicial institutions are presumably linked with sets of norms. These 
affinities between institutions and norms might also create discursive opportunity struc-
tures, making some legitimation criteria more “acceptable” than others in public de-
bates, more likely to be put forward, and also perhaps more likely to be employed in an 
affirmative fashion, especially by the incumbents of these institutions themselves 
(Schmidt 2008: 312). 
Are such expectations corroborated by our data? Turning to the US discourse first 
(Figure 3), it is strongly centered on the President (almost 22 per cent of all statements), 
and he is also by far the most important legitimizer of the American political system 
(nearly 97 per cent of Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s statements are affirmative). 
This finding underlines the extent to which the Presidency has become the core institu-
tion of the US system of government, not least due to the rhetorical and persuasive 
function of the office (Tulis 1987; Dorsey 2002). Its incumbent is not only the top 
newsmaker but also the leading motivational speaker of the nation. However, members 
of the non-presidential party in Congress are not far behind (16 per cent of all state-
ments) and the thrust of their discursive contributions is mostly affirmative (59 per cent) 
as well. These two speaker types alone represent almost forty per cent of the legitimacy 
evaluations in the US data set. Journalists are the next most frequent speaker type 
(NYT: 10.9 %, WP: 8.4 %). As expected, their contributions are much more critical 
(legitimacy levels of 39 and 32 per cent, respectively). The high proportion of political 
actors in the mediated discourse and the relatively low share of assessments contributed 
by journalists themselves not least reflect the strong propensity of the American press to 
use direct quotes in their reporting (the President’s State of the Union Address and other 
important speeches are frequently reprinted verbatim). There is only one more speaker 
type – academic experts – that represents more than five per cent of the identified legit-
imation statements; only about forty per cent of the evaluations made by this group are 
legitimating. Other speaker types have little voice, although the categories of individual 
“ordinary” citizens, NGO representatives, and “the people” at large each account for 
more than two per cent of all evaluations. 
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Figure 3: Legitimation discourses in the US, 1998–2007, (5,2)-core 
 
 
The German legitimation discourse (Figure 4) differs from the US discourse in that 
journalists themselves are the most central actors, responsible for 37 per cent of all le-
gitimation statements; legitimacy levels of merely 26 (SZ) and 15 per cent (FAZ) indi-
cate their highly critical perspective on the legitimacy of the German political system. 
Again, however, political actors (broadly speaking) are among the most prominent con-
tributors to the discourse: Justices of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundes-
verfassungsgericht) and the Chancellor, each with nine per cent of all legitimacy evalu-
ations, and – barely below the five per cent threshold – oppositional party members. 
While the top executive’s legitimating role in the German Chancellor democracy 
(Padgett 1994; Gast 2011) is almost as pronounced as the US President’s (85 per cent of 
Gerhard Schröder’s and Angela Merkel’s legitimation statements reported in the press 
are affirmative), oppositional party members (46 per cent) and, interestingly, Constitu-
tional Court Justices (23 per cent) are considerably more negative in their evaluations. 
Finally, with the exception of academia (nine per cent of all statements and a legitimacy 
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level of only 15 per cent), none of the speaker categories associated with civil society 
represent even two per cent of the identified evaluations. 
In short, our analysis of speaker types confirms the expected role of journalists them-
selves in mediated legitimation discourses and reveals marked center-periphery struc-
tures in terms of other discourse participants. Core institutions of the political system 
and their representatives dominate legitimacy-related communication together with 
journalists, and there is little difference between Germany and the United States in that 
regard. 
Figure 4: Legitimation discourse in Germany, 1998–2007, (5,2)-core 
 
 
Yet in line with the logic of the presidential system, the relative weights of the Presi-
dency and Congress are indeed fairly balanced in the US discourse, although the White 
House has a slight edge. The German discourse, on the other hand, reflects both the log-
ic of a parliamentary system (the Chancellor and other speakers of the government side 
are clearly over-represented) and the unusually prominent role of the judiciary; the rev-
erence for the Federal Constitutional Court is such that its members even get away with 
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a high level of criticism (Jestaedt et al. 2011). The role of speakers associated with civil 
society tends to be marginal in both cases, although they are slightly more visible in the 
US discourse. The corporatist v. pluralist nature of the German and US interest group 
systems does not appear to affect discursive structures very much. Trade unions and 
business associations as key players of German corporatism play a negligible role, and 
even in the United States there is only token representation of interest groups, NGOs, or 
religious organizations. The relatively prominent voice of academia is the only excep-
tion to the rule of negligible civil society influence. It is in line with the claim made by 
theorists of the knowledge society and more recently of discursive politics that the im-
portance of expert knowledge in the political sphere has grown (Fischer 1993; Bell 
1999). 
Our data also broadly confirms the expectation that political elites usually contribute 
to legitimation discourses in an affirmative fashion while the media and civil society are 
more critical. However, some qualifications are necessary: Even speaker types associat-
ed with the regime and its core institutions, such as members of the German judiciary, 
may occasionally contribute delegitimating statements, perhaps in an effort to shift 
blame from one regime institution and its incumbents to another. Overall, then, a link 
between institutional settings, the greater or lesser prominence of different speaker 
types, and their mainly legitimating or delegitimating role emerges. 
But how do these speakers justify their positive or negative evaluations of the Ger-
man and the American system of government? The graphs also reveal that some evalu-
ation standards dominate while others remain marginal in each case. In the US dis-
course, only four criteria are above a five per cent threshold: protection of human and 
civil rights (12 per cent of all statements), capability/leadership (11 per cent), morality 
(six per cent), and credibility (five per cent); nine more cross a two per cent threshold 
(popular sovereignty, effectiveness, common good orientation, stability, legality, inter-
national standing, distributive justice, moderation, participation). Only the (non-demo-
cratic input) criterion of capability/leadership as well as the (democratic output) criteria 
of human rights protection and common good orientation are used in a predominantly 
legitimating fashion (with associated legitimacy levels of 67 per cent, 78 per cent, and 
61 per cent). As the network graph demonstrates, however, the legitimating use of these 
three (and a range of additional) criteria is very much tied to the Presidency and, to a 
lesser extent, to other institutions and representatives of the American system of gov-
ernment; by evaluating the system positively in light of such criteria these speakers also 
legitimate themselves. Journalists and civil society actually criticize the system from a 
variety of angles, although few if any criteria stand out. 
In the German discourse, six criteria are above the five per cent threshold: capabil-
ity/leadership (13 per cent), protection of human rights (seven per cent), popular sover-
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eignty (seven per cent), effectiveness (six per cent), credibility (five per cent), and effi-
ciency (five per cent); eleven more cross the two per cent threshold (distributive justice, 
stability, accountability, common good orientation, innovation, expertise, tradition, le-
gality, morality, transparency, existence of a genuine demos/political community). The 
(democratic input) criteria of popular sovereignty and community (legitimacy levels of 
55 and 53 per cent) as well as the (democratic and non-democratic output) criteria of 
human rights protection and stability (61 and 64 per cent) are somewhat more likely to 
be used in an affirmative fashion. As the network graph shows, the Chancellor and other 
political actors tend to use these and some other criteria to legitimate the system they 
represent but are not nearly as successful as their American counterparts in making 
themselves heard with these kinds of legitimacy evaluations. Journalists and civil socie-
ty again use a broad range of criteria to delegitimate the system. 
In sum, the most important finding with regard to legitimation criteria is arguably the 
range of evaluation standards used by the various speaker types. Particular affinities 
between speakers and privileged criteria emerge occasionally (for instance, capabil-
ity/leadership and human rights protection in the case of the American President). Yet 
they are not always as expected (for instance, when the German Constitutional Court 
puts forward legitimation statements based on standards of capability/leadership and 
popular sovereignty as opposed to legality). Considering the distributions of legitima-
tion criteria as indicators of broader political cultures, we find, on the one hand, remark-
able similarities: Seven of the ten most widely used legitimation criteria in the German 
and US public spheres are the same; the standard of human rights protection serves as a 
legitimation resource (a criterion that is likely to underpin positive assessments) in both 
cases. Most criteria have a more negative thrust in Germany than in the United States, 
though, notably including the standards of capability/leadership and common good ori-
entation; the core democratic input criteria of popular sovereignty and participation 
have legitimacy levels above 50 per cent in Germany. However, other democratic input 
criteria (credibility, accountability) are also relatively prominent in the German dis-
course and have a strongly negative thrust. The standards of efficiency, stability, and 
accountability make it only to the German list of the ten most prominent legitimation 
criteria while morality, legality, and international standing are only part of the American 
list. 
Despite such differences, the structural similarities of the two legitimation discourses 
appear remarkably pronounced in light of the overall distribution of ties in the two dis-
course networks. Figure 6 presents a plot of the two degree distributions. It reveals al-
most identical exponential distribution structures with a low number of highly connect-
ed nodes and a very long tail of only weakly connected nodes. The two legitimation 
discourses show the typical degree distribution of small world networks (Watts 1999). 
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Whether this is a characteristic feature of legitimacy-related political communication or, 
instead, reflects a more fundamental media selection bias, and hence the general focus 
of attention on a limited number of actors, cannot be gleaned from our data. But the 
similar degree distribution and relatively high centralization of the two discourse net-
works (degree centralization DE: 0.42, US: 0.47) are indicators of structural similarities. 
Overall, the discourse networks reflect institutional differences. But the effect of these 
differences is mitigated by underlying structural similarities of the discourse networks – 
resulting in networks that are more similar than the political differences between Ger-
many and the United States would suggest. 
Figure 5: Degree distribution in the US and German legitimation discourse networks 
(all ties, 1998–2007) 
 
DISCOURSE COALITIONS 
As shown above, both national legitimation discourses are dominated by a relatively 
small number of core actors, and many speaker types privilege specific legitimation 
criteria to affirm or contest the legitimacy of the two political systems and their institu-
tions. In this section, we probe actor constellations: How are discourse participants con-
nected to each other? Which speaker types put forward similar legitimacy evaluations? 
Do these coalition structures once again mirror the institutional arrangements of the two 
political systems? The examination of actor co-occurrence networks – in which actors 
are connected if they share one or more types of legitimacy evaluations – enable us to 
answer such questions. The following analysis of actor co-occurrence networks is based 
on network cores (n-slices) where actors are connected by sharing n legitimation pat-
terns. Figure 6 depicts the 5-slices (US) and 4-slices (DE) of these networks.6 
                                                 
6 Journalists were excluded from the actor co-occurrence networks because at the chosen level of aggregation – all 
journalists writing for a given newspaper are treated as a single collective actor – they would always have been 
connected to almost all other actors due to the great variety of legitimation criteria used by this speaker type. 
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Figure 6: Actor co-occurrence networks, United States and Germany, 1998–2007 
 
 
These core actor networks reveal the existence of legitimating and delegitimating dis-
course coalitions below the surface of the two national legitimation discourses. Despite 
the national idiosyncrasies examined in the previous section, the underlying structures 
are surprisingly similar. In both cases, the legitimating discourse coalition is centered on 
the top executive – the President and the Chancellor – and other government actors. 
Conversely, non-governmental actors dominate the delegitimating coalitions. Speakers 
associated with parties and legislatures as well as academia link these two coalitions. 
However, even the President and the Chancellor are directly linked with the delegitimat-
ing coalition, a result of the fact that not all of their legitimation statements are affirma-
tive: While political elites presumably have a vested interest in the legitimation of the 
political system that they represent, they also engage in blame shifting and mutual criti-
cism, and hence might put forward negative evaluations of specific regime principles, 
institutions, or actor groups. In short, while the exact composition of the German and 
US discourse coalitions once again reflects differences between the two political sys-
tems, the underlying structures reveal a meta-structure of political legitimation dis-
courses in which roles and positions depend to a considerable extent on the institutional 
roles of actors within a polity. 
CONCLUSION 
Our discourse network analysis offers insights on the legitimation of political regimes in 
the quality press of Germany and the United States between 1998 and 2007. While there 
is some evidence for the impact of different journalistic styles, especially on the visibil-
ity of certain speaker types, analysis of the four newspaper-specific discourses (not 
shown in this paper) indicates that the corporatist or liberal structures of national media 
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systems in the United States and Germany as well as the varying ideological positions 
of the examined newspapers and their greater or lesser affinity to the governments of the 
day do not leave a strong mark on legitimation discourses. 
Secondly, however, the affiliation networks of the US and German legitimation dis-
courses reveal a structuring influence of each country’s institutional design on the pat-
terns of national legitimation discourses. Recently, scholars such as Vivien Schmidt 
have explored the relationship between institutional arrangements and discourses under 
the label of discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008). However, theories of legitima-
tion have so far only acknowledged the general importance of democratic institutions, 
suggesting that reliable decision-making rules embedded in institutions can create pro-
cedural legitimation (Luhmann 1978). Our analysis of legitimation discourses points to 
another institutional effect: The institutional design of a polity influences the visibility 
of political actors and their access to legitimation discourses. This observation goes be-
yond the notion of differing agenda-setting powers (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). It 
suggests that the topography of institutions together with national media cultures pro-
vides opportunity structures that enhance the voice of some actors and restrict the 
chance to be heard of others. A regime’s legitimacy is thus constructed and reproduced 
in a public sphere that offers differential access according to actor positions in the rele-
vant set of institutions. 
Thirdly, the differentiating effect of media systems and national institutions is miti-
gated by structural similarities of the discourse networks. A limited set of core actors 
and a limited set of core legitimation patterns dominate the discourse in both countries, 
leading to similar network metrics despite substantial differences. 
Fourthly, the networks reveal a pattern of legitimating political actors and delegiti-
mating non-state actors. On the one hand, this is not surprising, since we may expect 
rulers to defend the political system they represent. On the other hand, however, the 
dominant pattern that we see is not one in which government and opposition confront 
each other, but rather a conflict between political actors (including many oppositional 
party members) and (mostly) non-state actors, especially speakers associated with civil 
society. As tempting as it may seem for governments to attack opposition-dominated 
institutions and vice versa, and hence to instrumentalize legitimation discourses for par-
tisan purposes, such discursive strategies are not very prominent. Instead, political ac-
tors in government and opposition roles assume responsibility for the legitimation of the 
systems they represent. The observed pattern supersedes the otherwise pronounced in-
stitutional differences between the democratic political systems of Germany and the 
United States. Hence legitimation discourses are composed of (self-)legitimating dis-
course coalitions anchored around political actors and delegitimating coalitions domi-
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nated by non-state actors, while journalists of the German and US quality press provide 
both critical and, to some extent at least, affirmative evaluations. 
The analysis of discourse networks thus enables us to detect patterns that structure 
the discursive behavior of actors within institutional arrangements. In this paper, we 
have not touched upon the dynamics of this behavior. Information about the temporal 
sequence of discursive interventions would permit a much more detailed analysis of the 
development of legitimation discourses over time. This analysis might reveal additional 
patterns, such as the impact of political event on legitimation discourses or the recursive 
influences of discourses upon themselves. It is, for instance, highly probable that legiti-
mating or delegitimating claims respond to previous claims in a structured way 
(Schneider et al. 2010: chap. 5). With our limited sample of legitimation statements this 
option was not available, but further research should address these issues based on more 
extensive data  sets. Moreover, the approach outlined here is, in principle, suitable for a 
much more detailed analysis of discourse coalitions. Again, due to restrictions of our 
data set we limited our analysis to the level of aggregated speaker types. The analysis of 
specific (individual or collective) actors along the lines developed in this article might 
also inform theories of policy networks and advocacy coalitions and connect them to the 
study of legitimation processes. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2: Legitimation statements by year, paper, and country 
 Germany United States 
  SZ FAZ Σ  NYT WP Σ 
1998 7-18/11 52 54 106 24/1-4/2 52 46 98 
1999 20/11-1/12 58 32 90 16-27/1 119 65 184 
2000 25/11-6/12 27 19 46 22/1-2/2 59 39 98 
2001 24/11-5/12 25 28 53 27/1-7/2 23 7 30 
2002 30/11-11/12 47 37 84 26/1-6/2 66 28 94 
2003 22/11-3/12 36 66 102 25/1-5/2 114 86 200 
2004 20/11-1/12 45 70 115 17-28/1 87 86 173 
2005 26/11-7/12 30 52 82 29/1-9/2 72 52 124 
2006 18-29/11 29 15 44 28/1-8/2 82 66 148 
2007 24/11-5/12 20 10 30 20-31/1 38 46 84 
Σ  369 383 752  712 521 1.233 
 
Table 3: Percentage shares (groups of legitimation objects and criteria, speaker 
types) and associated legitimacy levels (LL, %) by country 
 Germany United States 
 % LL % LL 
Object I 42.3 41.2 69.8 58.1 
Object II 28.1 47.9 9.4 83.6 
Object III 17.6 26.5 15.6 33.9 
Object IV 12.1 3.3 5.2 6.3 
DI 23.9 32.8 20.4 36.9 
NDI 20.3 22.2 17.2 50.9 
DO 10.6 45.0 17.0 73.3 
NDO 27.1 31.4 23.7 44.2 
Unspecific 18.0 57.0 21.7 68.2 
Journalists 39.8 23.7 21.1 33.5 
Political actors 36.7 56.2 52.4 73.1 
Civil society 23.5 24.9 26.5 32.7 
(Overall)  35.9  54.0 
Note: object I = political community/system as a whole, object II = regime principles, object III = core institutions, 
object IV = major actor groups; DI = democratic input, NDI = non-democratic input, DO = democratic output, NDO 
= non-democratic output (Hurrelmann et al. 2009). 
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